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as a practical matter, if the passenger is bound to watch (1)
for trains on the track, and (2) for defects in the crossing, it
would seem that under the language of the court the passenger
cannot recover where the driver was negligent unless the negligence consisted of something which the passenger had no opportunity to prevent, such as suddenly swerving the car or stalling it.
The following question seems to be still in doubt: Can a
passenger go to sleep or be engaged in something requiring his
entire attention while the driver is approaching the crossing? In
the Young Case, supra, where the passenger was permitted to
recover she was holding a baby on her lap. In this case it does
not appear what the passenger was doing. It is submitted that
the duty on the passenger to be watchful of trains and at the same
time to be watchful of defects in the highway is a very severe
one and should not be extended to cases where the passenger was
doing something else which required his full attention.
-MMVILL STEWART.

FROM THE PHYSICAL TO T13 SOCIAL ScNCES-Rueff, Jacques,
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1929. xxxiv 159 pages.
This book is published under the auspices of the Institute for the
Study of Law at Johns Hopkins University, with the intention of
presenting a method whereby law may be rendered "scientific".
The introduction of twenty-three pages by Herman Oliphant and
Abram Hewitt of the Johns Hopkins Institute of Law is probably
the only part of the book which will be of interest to the lawyer.
Here the principal reasons for the confusion in law are stated
with force and illustrated with clarity. Three methods are in
common and occasionally conscious use among lawyers, namely
the transcendental, the inductive and the practical. The transcendental method "starts by assuming the existence of some general 'principles' within which the solution" of the concrete case
"is hidden away". (p. xii). Here the authors of the introduction
pause to make some very proper jeers about the origin and validity
of such transcendental "principles". The method assumes the
existence of a "natural law" composed of permanent principles
of right. The inductive method purports to derive the fundamental principles of justice from an examination of a number of
particular cases. The absurdity of this method is stated by the
authors thus: "If the principle thus 'induced' is no broader
than the sum of the previous eases which it summarizes, it obviously
does not and cannot include the case to be decided, which, by
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hypothesis, is a new and undecided case, and, hence, can form no
part of the generalization made from previous cases only. If it
does not include the case to be decided, it is powerless to produce
and determine a decision of it. If it is taken to include the case
to be decided, it assumes the very thing which is supposed to be
The third method of approach
up for decision." (p. xix).
is the practical. The decision of a case is here determined by a
reliance on "common sense"'-"a sort of intuition of experience
which assumes to know how to decide the practical questions of
life merely as a result of having lived in life". (p. xxv.).
In order to enable the lawyer to escape from the three fallacious
methods of approach above enumerated, the translation of this
book was undertaken; for Mr. Rueff apparently holds the remedy
for the piteous plight of law, in his discussion of a scientific method
applied to the social sciences.
But with the reading of the text itself the lawyer, however
accustomed to the strange jargon and confusion of his own field,
will probably lose interest and prefer to let r. Rueff keep his
remedy; for the disorder of the exposition and the unstable meaning of at least one ord, i. e. "reality" (pp. 16, 22, 78, 83, 154,
159 et passim), render a coherent interpretation almost impossible.
The point of departure is "living man, grappling with this something which resists him, which he calls reality, and which reveals
itself only in a succession of sensations. All that is real, all that
is given to him, is this series of sensations and nothing else." (p.
22). This unknown something, this "real" later turns out to be
"life, the entire life of the unverse * * * the vast synthesis of
all being, the infinite progress whose end we do not know"; (p.
69, see also pp. 62, 77, 95) though he elsewhere admits that such
a statement is meaningless by saying "that the nature of things,
the underlying reality, the logical cause of our sensations are
expressions which for us have no meaning and can have none."
(p. 60, see also p. 39). This is the first confusion.
By observing, by experimenting, and by living man derives
from these sensations "general rules which are the expression of
the common character of a certain group of sensations and which
serve to direct his future action. But these rules are no more
reality than is the sphericity of marbles. Before man had asserted
them they did not exist". (p. 22). These empirical rules are the
creation of human reason though they are not entirely arbitrary;
there is something in them not ourselves (pp. 57, 59). But to
enquire into this something is meaningless as has already asserted.
This is the second confusion. The practical rules of surveying as
known to, say, the ancient Egyptians may serve as an example
of the empirical laws derived from observation. Such rules precede
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the construction of a rational geometry. These empirical generalizations created by human reason apparently provide the subject
matter of the several sciences, or the "reality" which is to be explained by a rational theory. This use of the word "reality" as
compared with its use as meaning "life" constitutes a third confusion.
The explanation of the "reality" thus obtained is the work of the
theoretical sciences. Human reason governed by the Laws of
Identity and Causality demands a "nature of things" to exist, "to
be made up of things identical with themselves, and to be the
causes of observed phenomena" (p. 23). Thus, the rules of surveying are explained by "creating causes", that is by the invention
of "a system of propositions, axioms and definitions capable of
being the cause of the empirical rules laid down." For this, it
suffices that "reason operating on these propositions can draw
therefrom conclusions whose expression coincides with the rules of
surveying". (p. 29, see also p. 59). It is hard to see the necessity of creating such causes if their sole service is for the deduction
of proposition, the formulation of which coincides with the
previously known empirical rules. Possibly such a theory is a
mnemonic device useful in recalling a number of empirical rules,
but it scarcely deserves the name explanation.
The two requirements for any body of knowledge to fulfil in
order to become "scientific" are consequently as follows: First,
the proper selection and determination of the empirical rules constituting the "reality" of the science, and, second, the logical construction of a system from which propositions coinciding with
these empirical rules may be deduced. The author then proceeds
to review hastily various physical and social sciences showing how
the method is applied. Since the success of the method seems to
depend largely on the scientist's fertility of imagination in creating causes, it is clear the method would work admirably in religion.
As a matter of fact the author says that "from the purely logical
point of view the physical theory which can be built upon it (i. e.
religion) is sound." (p. 86). It thus appears strange that one
should prefer, at least on logical grounds, a modern scientific explanation of events to a primitive animistic explanation. Such
is the curious attitude which seems suggested in this treatise.
-J. R. CRESSWEL.
West Virginia University.
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